Constitutional Law- Confinement of Nondangerous Mentally Ill Capable Of Surviving Safely in Freedom Held to Violate Patient\u27s Right to  Liberty by unknown
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 2 Article 13
1976
Constitutional Law- Confinement of
Nondangerous Mentally Ill Capable Of Surviving
Safely in Freedom Held to Violate Patient's Right to
"Liberty"
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Richmond Law Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Constitutional Law- Confinement of Nondangerous Mentally Ill Capable Of Surviving Safely in Freedom Held to Violate Patient's Right to
"Liberty", 10 U. Rich. L. Rev. 402 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/13
Constitutional Law-CONFINEMENT OF NONDANGEROUS MENTALLY ILL CAP-
ABLE OF SURVIVING SAFELY IN FREEDOM HELD TO VIOLATE PATIENT'S RIGHT TO
"LIBERTY"-O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
The states have traditionally exercised broad power to commit the men-
tally ill.' Civil commitment of such persons has generally been justified
under two premises. First is the concept of parens patriae which justifies
the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill for their care and treat-
ment or protection from harm.' Second is the state's police power under
which it may safeguard the public health, safety, welfare and morals.3 The
substantive and procedural limitations upon this power may vary drasti-
cally from state to state.4 Despite the activity of the states in this area, no
constitutional mandate exists requiring a state to provide for the mentally
ill.,
The most fundamental deprivation caused by involuntary civil commit-
ment is the restriction or loss of individual liberty.' While it has only
1. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736 (1972), quoting AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 34-59 (rev. ed. 1971); Note, A New Emancipation: Toward
an End to Involuntary Civil Commitments, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1334 (1973); 41 Am. JUR.
2d Incompetent Persons § 33 (1968).
2. Under English law at the time of the settling of the American colonies, the King had
the authority to act as "the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics." Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972), quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court incorporated the law of parens patriae into its commit-
ment law thus shifting the burden of caring for the mentally ill from the private to the public
sphere. In re Oakes, 8 Law. Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845). The parens patriae power is "inherent in
the . . . power of every State . . . and often necessary to be exercised in the interests of
humanity. . . ." Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890). See also Higgins
v. United States, 205 F.2d 650, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1953); Developments in the Law-Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HAv. L. REV. 1190, 1207-08 (1974); 48 NOTRE DAME LAW.,
supra note 1, at 1334.
3. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905); 87 HARV. L. REV., supra
note 2, at 1209 n.53, 1222.
4. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). The Court cited an American Bar Foundation
study which indicated that:
[I]n nine States the sole criterion for involuntary commitment is dangerousness to
self or others; in 18 other States the patient's need for care or treatment was an
alternative basis; the latter was the sole basis in six additional States; a few States
had no statutory criteria at all, presumably leaving the determination to judicial
discretion. Id. at 737 n.19.
Many states mix criteria for commitment so that it may be impossible to determine an
exact justification for commitment. See Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L.
REV. 1134, 1139 n.20 (1967).
5. See Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 499 (D. Minn. 1974). Cf. Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller,
357 F. Supp. 752, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
6. The loss of individual liberty is obvious when one considers that the state can legally
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recently been recognized that such a deprivation of personal liberty vio-
lates constitutional safeguards,7 recent decisions point up the obvious four-
teenth amendment issues' raised by such a "massive curtailment of lib-
erty."' Cases in the past have dealt primarily with the various aspects of
the commitment process;' 0 thus, there is little case law dealing with the
state's obligation to the patient between the time of a justifiable commit-
ment and release and the requirements for release.' Considering the num-
ber of people affected,' 2 it is "remarkable" that the substantive constitu-
tional limitations on this exercise of state power are "not more frequently
litigated."' 3 42 U.S.C. § 198311 is a means by which the mentally ill have
remove an individual involuntarily to an institution for treatment despite the fact that he
has not violated a criminal statute. See Schneider, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 58
A.B.A.J. 1059, 1060 (1972).
7. As late as 1960, it was possible for a state supreme court to hold that involuntary civil
commitment is not "[s]uch [a] loss of liberty ... as is within the meaning of the constitu-
tional provision that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.'" Prochaska v. Brinegar, 251 Iowa 834, 838, 102 N.W.2d 870, 872 (1960).
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
9. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 655 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) which states "[tihere can
no longer be any doubt that the nature of the interests involved when a person ... [is]
involuntarily committed ... is 'one within the liberty and property language of the Four-
teenth Amendment."'
10. See note 24 infra. Numerous other cases have been dismissed based upon the immunity
doctrine. See note 41 infra.
11. This lack of case law can perhaps be attributed to the fact that most mental patients
are confined for only short periods of time. 87 HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1376-77.
Judge Bazelon notes that "[i]t makes little sense to guard zealously against the possibility
of unwarranted deprivations prior to hospitalization, only to abandon the watch once the
patient disappears behind hospital doors." Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). The Report of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on
the Judiciary notes that the legal profession is too often concerned with the procedures by
which the mentally ill are committed, but once hospitalized, like attention is not given to
protecting the patient's rights. 110 CONG. REc. 14553 (1964).
12. In 1961, an estimated 90% of the approximately 800,000 patients in mental hospitals
had been placed there through involuntary commitment. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
737 n.22 (1972).
13. 406 U.S. at 737.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originated in Klu Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §
1, 17 Stat. 13) reads as follows:
[E]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
1976]
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sought to insure the protection of their constitutional rights from state
encroachment. While this 1871 legislation was clearly not motivated by the
needs of the mentally ill, section 1983 covers a wider spectrum than the
redressing of instances of racial discrimination,'5 and has recently assumed
considerable importance through the protection of all individual four-
teenth amendment rights.'"
In the recent case of O'Connor v. Donaldson,1 7 the Supreme Court was
faced with the issue of a mental patient's rights subsequent to commit-
ment. Donaldson, a former mental patient who had been involuntarily
committed under civil commitment procedures to a state mental hospi-
tal,'8 instituted an action under section 198319 against the hospital's super-
intendent, O'Connor, and members of the hospital staff alleging that de-
fendants had intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his constitu-
tional right to liberty. 0 The evidence indicated that O'Connor had rejected
Donaldson's frequent requests for release despite Donaldson's apparent
ability to earn a living outside the hospital and responsible persons' will-
ingness to provide him any help necessary on release." The trial court
found Donaldson dangerous neither to himself nor to others, and, if
mentally ill, to have received no appreciable psychiatric treatment. 22
The Court framed the issue as whether "a State [can] constitutionally
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
15. The author of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 asserted that the act was intended to include
more than racial discrimination. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 68 (1871)
(remarks of Rep. Shellabarger). While supporters of the bill did not define its scope, oppo-
nents repeatedly referred during debate to its all-inclusive nature. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 364-66 (remarks of Rep. Arthur), 384-85 (remarks of Rep. Lewis) (1871);
Id. at 216-17 (remarks of Sen. Thurman), 260 (remarks of Rep. Eldridge and Rep. Holman)
(1871). See also Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 HARv.
L. REV. 1229, 1232 (1955).
16. For historical development of section 1983 see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171
(1961); Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871: Continuing Vitality, 40 NoTRE DAME LAW. 70
(1964). For development of section 1983 in the mental health area see Annot., 16 A.L.R. Fed.
440 (1973).
17. 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
18. Donaldson had been civilly confined to a state mental hospital on parens patriae
grounds and kept in custody against his will for over fourteen years.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 14 supra.
20. Donaldson originally filed his complaint as a class action on behalf of all his fellow
patients. However, after Donaldson's release, the district court dismissed the class action
aspect of the suit. 95 S. Ct. at 2488.
21. Id. at 2490.
22. Id. at 2492. It is possible that the trial jury determined Donaldson not only to be




confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviv-
ing safely in freedom by himself or with help of willing and responsible
family members and friends."' In finding such confinement unconstitu-
tional, the Court narrowly construed the issue and refused to address the
question of whether, when, or by what procedure a mentally ill person may
be confined by the state.Y However, the Court noted that even had the
initial commitment been permissible, "[a] finding of 'mental illness'
alone cannot justify a State's locking a person up against his will and
keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement.
'2
Regarding purely custodial confinement, O'Connor is significant since it
offered the Supreme Court its first opportunity to address the "right to
treatment" issue. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 2 in a far-reaching
opinion recognized such a right of individuals who are involuntarily civilly
committed to state mental hospitals guaranteed by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.? The discovery of a right to treatment doc-
trine is attributed to an article published in 1960.2 The doctrine first
attained judicial recognition in Rouse v. Cameron" in which Judge Baze-
23. Id. at 2494.
24. The Court deemed the issue of state commitment procedure irrelevant because Donald-
son was not contesting his initial commitment, but rather his continued confinement subse-
quent to commitment. However, the Court did point out that the Florida statutory provisions
were less than clear in specifying the grounds necessary for commitment, and the record was
scanty as to Donaldson's condition upon commitment. Id. at 2489.
While the Supreme Court has never explicitly considered the impact of due process on civil
commitment procedures, it has ruled on challenges in closely related areas. See, e.g., McNeil
v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972) (confinement that is indeterminate
violates due process when based upon procedures designed to authorize brief period of obser-
vation); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (indefinite commitment of a criminal solely
on account of his incompetency to stand trial violates due process when there is little proba-
bility of recovery); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (due process requires certain procedural
safeguards akin to those traditional in criminal law despite the civil nature of the proceedings
and their benign intent); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (when definite sentence of
sex offender is converted into indefinite confinement, due process requires such procedural
safeguards as right to counsel and right to be heard and confront witnesses).
25. 95 S. Ct. at 2493.
26, Donaldson v. O'Conner, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
27. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a nondangerous person who is involuntar-
ily civilly committed to a state mental hospital has "a constitutional right to such treatment
as will help him to be cured or to improve his mental condition." Id. at 527.
This constitutional right to treatment was based on a two-part rationale. First, the court
reasoned that where the basis for commitment was treatment, then the fundamentals of due
process were violated if treatment was in fact not provided. Id. at 521. Secondly, the court
held that due process required the state to extend treatment as the quid pro quo for its right
to deprive an individual of his liberty. Id. at 522.
28. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
29. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). There are numerous subsequent decisions supporting the
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Ion stated that "[a]bsent treatment, the hospital is 'transform[ed] . . .
into a penetentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted
offense .... ' "30
The circuit court had held that where the justification of commitment
was treatment, as under the parens patriae doctrine, then fundamental
due process requires treatment .3 While the Supreme Court chose to evade
this issue noting that the posture of the case did not justify such broad
constitutional analysis, 3 dicta in the instant case and other recent cases
appear to lend some support to the circuit court's reasoning. The O'Connor
decision pointed out that confinement could not "constitutionally continue
after [the] . . . basis [for commitment] no longer existed. '33 The Court
further noted that where treatment was the state's only ground for depriv-
ing the patient of his liberty, the court could determine if treatment was
in fact being provided. 4 The Supreme Court in two earlier cases stated
that due process required that the nature and duration of commitment
bear some reasonable relation to "the purpose for which the individual is
committed. 35 Even though Chief Justice Burger emphasized in his con-
curring opinion that there was no correlation between a patient's constitu-
tional right not to be confined without due process of law and a constitu-
tional right to treatment," the majority's failure to specifically deal with
this issue is not likely to dissuade those courts which have adopted the
constitutional right to treatment doctrine.
One of the most "perplexing problems" faced in recent cases arising
under the civil rights statutes concerns the extent to which state officials
right to treatment. See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Welsch v.
Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974); Negron v. Preiser, 382 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Contra, New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349
F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972). See also Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36
U. Cm. L. REV. 742 (1969); 87 HARV. L. REV., supra note 2, at 1325; Note, Civil Rights: The
Federal Courts and the "Right to Treatment" Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), 27 OKLA. L.
REV. 238 (1974); 53 VA. L. REV., supra note 4, at 1134; Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness,
and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87. (1967); 27 FLA. L. REv. 295 (1974); 23 KAN. L.
REV. 188 (1974); 35 LA. L. REV. 563 (1975); 46 Miss. L.J. 345 (1975). See generally Mental
Health Law Bibliography, 6 TOLEDO L. REV. 314, 333 (1974).
30. 373 F.2d at 453.
31. 493 F.2d at 521.
32. 95 S. Ct. at 2492.
33. Id. at 2493.
34. Id. n.10.
35. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution,
407 U.S. 245, 250 (1972).
36. 95 S. Ct. at 2500.
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by reason of their office should be immune from liability under those
laws.37 The inherent conflicts of extending the common-law doctrine of
immunity to section 1983 are obvious considering that the statute makes
liable "every person"3 who under color of state law deprives another of his
civil rights." The Supreme Court has ruled that the traditional immunity
afforded to legislators, 0 judges,41 and executive officers42 was not abrogated
by the Civil Rights Act, but extension of immunity to subordinate officers
remained an open question4" until Wood v. Strickland."
In Wood, the Court extended to school board members a qualified good
faith immunity from liability for damages under section 1983.11 However,
the potential nullifying effect which the ruling could have on the Civil
Rights Act was tempered to a large extent by the heavy burden placed
upon the official.46 The official was held not only to a standard of good faith
37. 68 HARV. L. REV., supra note 15.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 14 supra.
39. A series of Second Circuit cases outline the perils of applying immunity to the Civil
Rights Acts. Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[Ihe defense of official
immunity should be used sparingly in suits brought under § 1983."); Jobson v. Henne, 355
F.2d 129, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1966) ("It should be equally clear that both the language and the
purpose of the Civil Rights Acts are inconsistent with the application of common law notions
of official immunity. . . ." To give state officials this immunity under section 1983 "would
practically constitute a repeal of the Civil Rights Acts."); Birnbaum v. Trussell, 347 F.2d 86,
88-89 (2d Cir. 1965) ("It would nullify the whole purpose of the civil rights statutes to permit
all governmental officers to resort to the doctrine of official immunity."). See generally
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961) ("Congress has the power to enforce provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State...
whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.").
40. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
41. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
42. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
43. Several lower courts have recognized varying degrees of immunity for subordinate
officials. See, e.g., Joyce v. Ferrazzi, 323 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1963); Hoffman v. Halden, 268
F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959) (hospital superintendent in deciding when patient was ready for
release was exercising discretionary function and thus was immune); Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d
288, 290 (6th Cir. 1956) ("Institutional doctors should not be expected or even permitted to
go behind a court order of commitment."); Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954);
Ferenc v. McGuire, 353 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (any public official is immune if acting
pursuant to court discretion); Campbell v. Glenwood Hills Hosp., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 27
(D.Minn. 1963); Miller v. Director, Middletown State Hosp., 146 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). But see note 37 supra.
44. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
45. The test set forth in Wood is whether the state official "knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of [an individual], or if he took the action with the malicious intention
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury. . . ." Id. at 322.
46. Mr. Justice Powell, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and
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"but also [to] knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights
of his charges."' 7 The Court's rigid standard requires knowledge of "set-
tled, indisputable law;"' 8 ignorance of such law is equated with "actual
malice."'" The Court in O'Connor vacated the circuit court opinion and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of Wood." Dr.
O'Connor will be hard-pressed to meet this onerous standard especially in
light of the trial court's finding that he knowingly confined Donaldson and
thereby violated his constitutional right to freedom.5'
Although it firmly recognizes the fourteenth amendment right to liberty
of a nondangerous mental patient who has been involuntarily committed,
O'Connor opens the door to a series of unanswered questions. In narrowly
framing the issue, the Court refused to decide whether the state may
compulsorily confine a nondangerous mentally ill person for treatment 2 or
whether the dangerous mentally ill person has a right to treatment upon
compulsory confinement by the state.5 Absence of litigation leaves the
boundaries of these rights largely undefined.
In questioning the state's authority to confine the harmless mentally ill,
the Court signals judicial intervention in an area that has traditionally
been left to the legislature and administrative agencies. The dangerous-
nondangerous dichotomy suggests a possible substantive due process limi-
tation on the state's power to commit its mentally ill citizens.5 The ade-
Rehnquist joined, dissented as to the harsh standard of care placed upon the state official.
The dissenting justices advocated the lesser good faith standard set forth in Scheuer (see note
42 supra) which is based on "the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the
time and in light of all the circumstances .... " Id. at 330, quoting 416 U.S. at 247-48.
47. Id. at 322.
48. Id. at 321.
49. Id.
50. 95 S. Ct. at 2495.
51. Id.
52. Chief Justice Burger states, in his concurring opinion, that a state can not justify
confinement solely by providing treatment since due process will not permit such a "trade-
off." Id. at 2500.
The majority noted that where treatment is the only ground for confining an individual,
the courts need not rely on the discretion of the psychiatric profession but may determine if
treatment is in fact being provided. Id. at 2493 n.10.
53. Involuntary civil commitment would presumably be no less a curtailment of liberty for
the dangerous patient than the nondangerous. Yet, traditionally, the rationale behind com-
mitment of the dangerous mentally ill has been prevention of dangerous acts, not rehabilita-
tive treatment. Thus, reading the O'Connor opinion narrowly, the dangerous mentally ill
patient could be confined in simple, custodial confinement so long as the basis for commit-
ment remained, or in short, until the patient ceased to be dangerous to himself or others.
54. Dicta in two recent cases lend support to this contention. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 728 (1972), the Court required a finding of dangerousness in its construction of a
[Vol. 10:402
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quacy of the parens patriae justification for involuntarily committing the
harmless mentally ill for simple custodial confinement is apparently with-
out constitutional basis even though state law may have authorized such
confinement." Even assuming that the basis for commitment is constitu-
tionally adequate, involuntary confinement may not constitutionally
continue after that basis no longer exists. 6 The Court is reluctant to deal
explicitly with the adequacy of state commitment and confinement stan-
dards in this opinion, but such standards are brought into question in
dicta, which could have far-reaching consequences on the state's tradi-
tional power to commit and confine. It seems inevitable that these issues
will be put before the Court in future litigation."
G. C.H.
state detention statute in the interest of the "welfare of such persons." In Humphrey v. Cady,
405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972), the Court construed a similar statute as requiring a "social and legal
judgment that [the mentally ill individual's] potential for doing harm, to himself or to
others, is great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty."
55. 95 S. Ct. at 2493. The Court specifically noted other instances when confinement would
not be justifiable. The state may not confine the harmless mentally ill for the purpose of
providing them a higher standard of living than they would enjoy outside the institution. Nor
may the state confine the harmless mentally ill merely to protect the public from exposure
to those whose ways may be different. Deprivation of a person's physical liberty may not be
constitutionally justified based on the intolerance or animosity of the public. Id. at 2493-94.
56. Id. It would follow that if the dangerous mentally ill individual committed under the
police power ceases to be dangerous or if the individual unable to care for himself attains the
ability to live safely in freedom, then the state's authority to confine would cease to exist.
57. The potential for a flood of litigation exists since much of the care provided by mental
institutions is "merely custodial." 77 YALE L.J., supra note 29, at 88.
